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NOTE
IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WE TRUST?
FEDERAL FUNDING FOR TRIBAL WATER
RIGHTS SETTLEMENTS AND THE TAOS
PUEBLO INDIAN WATER RIGHTS
SETTLEMENT ACT
Erin B. Agee*
Today's relationshipbetween federally recognized Indian tribes and
the federal government is complex. Tribes must be able to decide how
they wish to manage their water resources, and yet the federal-tribal
trust relationshipmeans tribes also rely on the federal government to act
in their best interests regarding these water resources. As settlement
continues to be a preferred approach to resolve tribal water rights disputes, the federal government must ensure that tribes have the appropriate tools to negotiate these settlement agreements without dictating the
exact content of the settlements. Despite the federal-tribal trust responsibility, federal funding for such settlement negotiations is limited, and
fundingfor settlement implementation continues to rely on a constrained
Bureau of Indian Affairs budget. As a result, where there is inadequate
federalfunding for tribalwater settlements, tribes may go decades without securing the water to which they are entitled.
This Note suggests that if the federal government is to fulfill its trust
responsibility to tribes in securing their water rights, the federal government should train and encourage tribal members to play a more integral
role in the negotiation teams that secure tribal water rights. By placing
the exact contours of tribal water negotiations more thoroughly in the
tribes' hands, the federal government would, over time, relieve some of
its negotiation team funding burden as well as honor the federal goal of
encouraging more meaningful tribal self-determination.
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INTRODUCTION: TRIBAL WATER RIGHTS AND THE FEDERAL-TRIBAL
TRUST RELATIONSHIP
Today's relationship between federally recognized Indian tribes and

the federal government is complex.'

As the historical flip-flopping of

U.S. congressional policy toward Indian tribes demonstrates, a significant tension dwells at the intersection of federal control or supervision
over federally recognized Indian tribes and federal encouragement of tri-

bal self-government. 2 This tension is particularly present in the context

of tribal natural resource management. 3 Tribes must be able to decide
how they wish to manage their resources, and yet, because the federal

government is the tribes' trustee for these natural resources,4 tribes must
1 See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 226 (2004) (Souter, J., dissenting) ("It is as
true today as it was in 1886 that the relationship of Indian tribes to the National Government is
'an anomalous one and of a complex character.'" (quoting United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S.
375, 381 (1886))).
2 Within the span of a century, the U.S. congressional policy toward Indian tribes went
from full assimilation into white culture, to termination of Indian tribes, to self-determination.
See RICHARD NIXON, MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TRANSMITTING
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INDIAN POLICY, H.R. Doc. No. 91-363, at 3 (2d Sess. 1970) ("[T]he

goal of any new national policy toward the Indian people . . . [must be] to strengthen the
Indian's sense of autonomy without threatening his sense of community."); Robert T. Anderson, Indian Water Rights, PracticalReasoning, and Negotiated Settlements, 98 CAL. L. REV.

1133, 1138 (2010) (explaining the congressional policy of assimilation and the 1934 Indian
Reorganization Act in context of Indian water rights).
3 See, e.g., Judith Royster, Indian Water and the Federal Trust: Some Proposalsfor
FederalAction, 46 NAT. RESOURCES J. 375, 375-76, 380 (2006) (explaining how the federal

government holds tribal water rights in trust for the tribes and yet this does not automatically
trigger full fiduciary duties).
4 See FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 3.04, at 182-200 (Nell
Jessup Newton et al. eds., 2005) [hereinafter HANDBOOK].
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also be able to rely on the federal government to act in their best interests
regarding these resources.
Water, a most valuable and increasingly contentious natural resource-especially in the arid Western region of the United States 5 -is
one such natural resource that tribes rely on the federal government to
adequately secure. 6 As settlement continues to be a preferred approach
to resolve tribal water rights disputes,7 the federal government must ensure that tribes have the appropriate tools to negotiate these settlement
agreements without dictating the exact content of the settlements, as such
would impede on tribes' inherent sovereign right to self-government.8
While tribes are able to participate in the settlement process to varying
degrees, depending on their financial resources, 9 many tribes still depend
on the federal government to provide federal negotiation teams to help
them effectively represent their tribal water interests in the negotiation
5 See BONNIE G. COLBY, JOHN E. THORSON & SARAH BRITrON, NEGOTIATING TRIBAL

RIGHTS xix (2005) ("The rapid growth of western cities, full appropriation of dependable river flows, declining groundwater levels, and increased environmental needs for water all
lead to intense competition for limited water supplies and pressure to address tribal water
claims.").
WATER

6 See HANDBOOK, supra note 4,

§

19.06, at 1220-21 ("The United States, in its role as

trustee of Indian lands, is charged with the responsibility of administering trust property for the
sole use and benefit of the Indian tribes .

..

. To that end, Congress has recognized the federal

government's 'trust responsibilities to protect Indian water rights and assist Tribes in the wise
use of those resources."' (quoting Western Water Policy Review Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-575, title XXX, § 3002(9), reprintedin 43 U.S.C. § 371)); Royster, supra note 3, at 377
(explaining that the federal government has long been understood to be responsible for ensuring that tribes have adequate water because reservation lands "would have little value without
the water necessary to make the reservation livable").
7 See Taos Pueblo Indian Water Rights Settlement Act of 2009 and Aamodt Litigation
Settlement Act of 2009: Hearing on H.R. 3254 and H.R. 3342 Before the Subcomm. on Water
and Power of the H. Comm. on Natural Resources, 111th Cong. 15 (2009) (statement of

Michael L. Connor, Comm'r, Bureau of Reclamation) [hereinafter H.R. 3254 Statement]
("[F]or over 20 years, federally recognized Indian tribes, states, local parties, and the Federal
government have acknowledged that, when possible, negotiated Indian water rights settlements
are preferable to protracted litigation over Indian water rights claims."); COLBY ET AL., supra
note 5, at xvi ("Since the 1980s, settlement negotiations have been an integral part of the
process used by tribes, the federal government, and states in attempting to resolve Indian water
rights claims.").
8 See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 518 (1832) (recognizing that tribal
nations did not surrender self-government just because Congress was responsible for "managing all their affairs"); but see Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 545-46 (1981)
("[T]hrough specific treaties and statutes, the Indian tribes have lost many of the attributes of
sovereignty . . . Exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal selfgovernment or to control internal relations is inconsistent with the dependent status of the
tribes . . . .").
9 See WESTERN GOVERNORs' Ass'N, WATER NEEDS AND STRATEGIES FOR A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE 19 (2006) [hereinafter WATER NEEDS AND STRATEGIES] ("Funding for tribes'

attorneys and technical experts has been so severely reduced over the past few years that it
[has made] it difficult for tribes to meaningfully participate in the [negotiation] process.").
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process.' 0 Despite this responsibility, federal funding for such settlement
negotiations has been limited for years,I' and funding for the implementation of settlement terms continues to rely on a constrained Bureau of
Indian Affairs budget. 12 As a result, where there is inadequate federal
funding for tribal water settlements, tribes may go decades without securing the water to which they are entitled.' 3
This Note suggests that if the federal government is to fulfill its trust
responsibility to tribes in securing their water rights, it must approach
this responsibility with a longer-term view than settlement-by-settlement
negotiation. Instead of merely allocating inadequate funds to pay for
federal negotiation teams, engineers, hydrologists, and economists to
help the tribes during the negotiation process, the federal government
should spend some of its resources to train and encourage tribal members
to play a more integral part in the negotiation teams that the tribes otherwise depend on the federal government to provide. Over time, this approach would partially relieve the federal government's burden of
funding full negotiation teams for the tribes, and also honor the federal
goal of encouraging tribal self-determination by placing the exact contours of tribal water negotiations more thoroughly where they belong-in
the tribes' hands.14
10 See

DANIEL

MCCOOL,

NATIVE WATERS: CONTEMPORARY INDIAN WATER SETTLE-

MENTS AND THE SECOND TREATY ERA 56 (2002) ("By the early 1990s tribes were literally
lining up for federal negotiation teams, but the Department of the Interior did not have the
money to field all of the requested teams."); see also COLBY ET AL., supra note 5, at 35

(explaining that while the federal government must fulfill its trust responsibility to tribes the
federal government represents many conflicting interests in any one tribal water settlement,
including: water rights of other federal reserves, such as national forests and parks, water
quality under the federal Clean Water Act, endangered species under the federal Endangered
Species Act, and taxpayers "by requiring reasonably priced settlements that include adequate
state and local contributions of money and water").
II See McCOOL, supra note 10, at 56.
12 See COLBY ET AL., supra note 5, at 70 ("The costs of Indian water settlements are

absorbed out of the BIA's budget, which means that settlement-related expenditures must be
offset by reductions to services available to other Indian tribes. Because of the annual limit on
the portion of the Interior Department's budget that can be used for Indian water rights settlements, funding has proved inadequate.").
13 See id. at 71 (explaining that even where a tribe receives a tribal water settlement
agreement or congressionally approved act, this "merely authorizes the settlement and does not
ensure its funding," and settlements "typically are funded in stages through the annual congressional appropriations process, often over a period of years").
14 See id. at 19 ("The most daunting challenge facing many tribes is the need to provide
viable reservation economies for existing residents-especially the young. An important part
of those future economies will be water resources."); see also MCCooL, supra note 10, at
54-55 ("Budget conscious officials ... have long contended that ... no settlement should cost
more than the federal government's legal exposure to claims and damages. [Some federal
policymakers] argue that the [water] settlements are simply part of the government's larger
trust responsibility and should help fund long-term goals such as tribal economic development."). Putting the representation of tribal water rights more completely in the hands of the
tribes themselves would also help alleviate the concerns regarding the federal government's
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Part I explains the basic framework of the federal-tribal trust relationship, recognizing that while not always well defined, it is an important aspect of the federal-tribal legal relationship today. Part II focuses
on the federal trust responsibility as applied specifically to tribal water
rights, and Part III looks at this responsibility as related to tribal water
rights settlements. After providing this legal context, Parts IV and V,
respectively, explore the Taos Pueblo Indian Water Rights Settlement
Agreement and the corresponding Taos Pueblo Indian Water Rights Settlement Act. These Parts will illustrate the nature of many tribal water
rights settlements as well as demonstrate the need for a long-term view
toward the federal trust responsibility as related to tribal water rights settlements. Despite the plethora of tribal water rights settlement agreements, this Note focuses on the Taos Pueblo Indian Water Rights
Settlement because it is an example of a long-awaited settlement between
many and diverse stakeholders, and one that also offers a clear example
of the still-present federal hesitancy to fund these much-needed tribal
water settlements.
Part VI proposes that if the federal government is going to meaningfully fulfill its trust responsibility to tribes in securing their water rights
through settlement, it must approach this trust responsibility with a
longer-term view of tribal water rights than it currently uses. This Note
suggests that one way to express such a long-term approach could be by
training and encouraging tribal members to play a more integral role in
the negotiation teams, which the tribes often depend on the federal government to provide. This approach would, over time, both alleviate some
of the burden on the federal government to fund federal negotiation
teams for tribal water rights settlements, and more importantly, encourage the tribal self-government that will be necessary to ensure longterm tribal water security. Before concluding, Part VII explores some of
the challenges of this approach, including comprehensive practical implementation, and potential federal resistance to integrating the tribes
more thoroughly into the negotiation process while still funding the federal portion of the settlement's implementation. This Note concludes
that despite these potential challenges, an approach toward tribal water
rights settlements that operates with a longer-term view toward the federal-tribal trust relationship than that which the federal government currently uses, is a better policy approach to ensure that tribes receive all the
water to which they are entitled.

conflict of interest during tribal water rights settlement negotiations. See
note 5, at 38.

COLBY

Er

AL.,

supra
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I. THE FEDERAL-TRIBAL TRUST RESPONSIBILITY
Today's legal relationship between the federal government and federally recognized Indian tribes is in large part a trust relationship.' 5

While this federal-tribal trust relationship is not identical to a private
trust relationship because the federal government can and must represent
other interests apart from the interests of federally recognized tribes,' 6
important characteristics carry over from the private trust relationship to
the federal-tribal trust relationship.17 Most basically, a private trust relationship is a "fiduciary relationship with respect to property, subjecting
the person by whom the title to the property is held to equitable duties to
deal with the property for the benefit of another person."' 8 This fiduciary relationship "demands an exceptionally high standard of moral con-

duct from the trustee toward the beneficiary." 19
The federal-tribal trust relationship originates from treaties, statutes,
and Supreme Court opinions, and has been explained in a variety of
ways-from a special relationship predicated on the fact that the tribal
"relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian," 20
to more recent language of trustee and beneficiary. 21 While it would be
inconsistent with the realistic functioning of the federal government to

require it to protect tribal interests to the exclusion of all other interests,
15 See United States v. Mitchell (Mitchell I), 463 U.S. 206, 225 (1983) ("[T]he undisputed existence of a general trust relationship between the United States and the Indian people
... [is a] principle [that] has long dominated the Government's dealings with the Indians.").
The Supreme Court confirmed this general trust relationship between the federal government
and Indian tribes in United States v. Navajo Nation. 537 U.S. 488, 490 (2003).

16 See Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 128 (1983) ("[T]he Government cannot
follow the fastidious standards of a private fiduciary, who would breach his duties to his single
beneficiary solely by representing potentially conflicting interests without the beneficiary's
consent.").
17 See Mary Christina Wood, Protecting the Attributes of Native Sovereignty: A New
Trust Paradigmfor Federal Actions Affecting Tribal Lands and Resources, 1995 UTAH L.

REV. 109, 125 (1995) ("While specific rules of private trust law are often misplaced in the
public law context, the basic foundational premises of private trust law may be transferable ...
[to the federal-tribal trust relationship]."); id. at 115-16 (arguing that comparing the private
trust model to the tribal trust model is often "too simplistic" because "Indian tribal interest
nearly always implicates a host of factors relating to the tribe's sovereign status that are not
encountered in the individual-beneficiary context").
18 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 (1959).
19 Ann C. Juliano, Conflicted Justice: The DepartmentofJustice's Conflict ofInterest in
Representing Native American Tribes, 37 GA. L. REv. 1307, 1312 (2003) (citing GEORGE
GLEASON BOGERT ET AL., BOGERT'S TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § I (2d ed. 1984)); see also White

Mountain Apache Tribe v. United States, 11 Cl. Ct. 614, 650 (1987) ("Although the rules
governing the relationship between private fiduciaries and their beneficiaries do not apply
necessarily with full vigor to the Government-Indian fiduciary relationship, it is entirely appro-

priate to utilize the general law of fiduciary relationships [to help characterize certain federaltribal trust relationships].").

20 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
21 See HANDBOOK, supra note 4,

§

5.04[4][a], at 419.
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especially its own,2 2 the federal government nevertheless holds land and
other property assets in trust for tribes 23 and, therefore, owes a duty as
trustee to act in the tribes' best interest respecting these assets. 24 Some
legal scholars argue that there is a disturbingly unavoidable conflict of
interest inherent to the federal government's role as trustee to federally
recognized tribes. 2 5 However, this federal trust responsibility, while
often rationalized by paternalistic notions, 26 and at times used to justify
congressional plenary power over tribal affairs, 27 has been, and continues
to be, a vital component of the legal relationship between federally recognized tribes and the U.S. federal government. 2 8 It is easy to say that
there is a federal-tribal trust relationship. 29 It is not as easy to define just
what this trust relationship encompasses.
There are three main categories of the federal-tribal trust relationship that determine the scope of what triggers a trust responsibility, what
kind of trust responsibility it is, and what is available to a tribe if it shows
22 See Juliano, supra note 19, at 1325-26 (explaining that the Department of Justice's
Environment and Natural Resources Division (ENRD) has two sections that are responsible for
civil litigation relating to tribes. The General Litigation Section litigates claims on behalf of
the United States in defense of Indian tribes or individuals, and the Indian Resources Section
litigates on behalf of Indian tribes and individuals. While this division ensures that the same
federal attorney does not represent both parties, both sections ultimately answer to the same
Attorney General who determines the position of the ENRD in the litigation). Although one
legal scholar argued that the federal-tribal trust responsibility should incorporate a standard by
which to ensure that the tribe's interests are prioritized over other countervailing federal interests, no such standard has been adopted. See Wood, supra note 17, at 116.
23 See generally HANDBOOK, supra note 4,

§ 3.04,

at 182-200 (discussing the definition

and significance of "Indian Country.").

24 See id. § 19.06, at 1220-21.
25 See Juliano, supra note 19, at 1329.

26 The Supreme Court repeatedly articulated the rationale for this trust relationship in
blatantly paternalistic language. See, e.g., United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886)
(finding that because the tribes were largely dependent on the United States, federal power
over "these remnants of a race once powerful, now weak and diminished in numbers, is necessary to their protection"); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831) (characterizing the tribes as "domestic dependent nations ... in a state of pupilage").
27 See Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384 (1886) ("From their very weakness and helplessness
... there arises the duty of protection, and with it the power."); Kevin Gover, An Indian Trust
for the Twenty-First Century, 46 NAT. RESOURCES J. 317, 318 (2006) ("By the end of [the

nineteenth] century, [the trust relationship] had evolved into an intrusive means of denying
Tribes control of their lands through the exercise of an unconstrained federal power to manage
Indian property regardless of the desires of the Indians.").
28 See HANDBOOK, supra note 4,

§ 5.04[4][a], at 419

("Today the trust doctrine is one of

the cornerstones of Indian law.").
29 While the federal-tribal trust relationship is well established, it exists only so long as
the federal government chooses to recognize a tribe. It is within Congress's plenary power
over Indian affairs to abrogate the trust relationship entirely by terminating federal recognition
of a tribe. See, e.g., United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 203 (2004) ("One can readily find
examples in congressional decisions to recognize, or to terminate, the existence of individual
tribes."); Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 408 (1968) (discussing
the Termination Act of 1954); 25 U.S.C. § 564 (1982) (terminating the "Federal supervision
over the trust and restricted property of the Klamath Tribe of Indians").
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that the federal government has breached this trust responsibility.30 The
first and broadest trust responsibility is called the "general" or "historic"
trust responsibility. 3 1 While a general trust relationship exists between
the federal government and every federally recognized tribe, 32 this general trust relationship is limited in practice, as it does not create a cause
of action for money damages,33 and "at most provides the rationale for
reading statutes liberally." 34 The second category of the federal trust responsibility is called a "bare" or "limited" trust, and only a specific statutory provision creating such a responsibility can trigger it.35 Equitable
relief is the most common form of recovery for breach of a limited trust
responsibility, but money damages are also possible.36 Whatever the
form of the relief, the language that triggers the limited trust is not expansive enough to "impose any duties not encompassed within the limits
of the trust," as explicitly stated in the statutory provision.37 The third
and highest level of the federal trust responsibility is the "full fiduciary"
responsibility.38 Statutes, regulations, or management by the federal
government trigger this full fiduciary responsibility, and the remedy for
breach of this responsibility is money damages. 39 Where the language of
the statute is ambiguous about whether it creates a trust responsibility,
courts may construe the statutes in favor of the Indians, as consistent
with the canons of statutory construction. 40 Even if there is no explicit
statutory provision setting forth a federal trust responsibility, there may
be a full fiduciary responsibility where a federal statutory or regulatory
scheme authorizes comprehensive or pervasive control over a tribal resource, such as "timber management .

.

. oil and gas leasing, and man-

agement of Indian tribal and individual trust funds." 4 1
30 See HANDBOOK, supra note 4,

§

5.05[1][b], at 428-29.

31 See id.

32 See Juliano, supra note 19, at 1362.
33 See HANDBOOK, supra note 4, § 5.05[1][b], at 429.
34 Juliano, supra note 19, at 1362.
35 See HANDBOOK, supra note 4, § 5.05[1][b], at 429.
36 See id.
37 Id.

38 See United States v. Mitchell (Mitchell II), 463 U.S. 206, 233 (1983) (quoting United
States v. Mitchell (Mitchell 1), 445 U.S. 535, 542 (1980)).
39 See HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at § 5.05[l][b], at 429.
40 See id. § 5.05[l][b], at 429-430 (citing Shoshone Indian Tribe of the Wind River

Reservation v. United States, 364 F.3d 1339, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see also Jill De La Hunt,
The Canons of Indian Treaty and Statutory Construction:A Proposalfor Codification, 17 U.
MICH. J. L. REFORM 681, 688 (1984) ("The canons of construction are more than discretionary

rules of interpretation. These principles are substantive components of the trust relationship
.); cf El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. United States, Nos. 10-5080, 10-5090, 2011 WL
281035, at *6 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 28, 2011) (imposing limitations on when liberal construction is
used: statute must be (1) ambiguous, and (2) "for the benefit" of Indians).
41 HANDBOOK, supra note 4,

§

5.05[1][b], at 430.
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In the 1983 decision of United States v. Mitchell (Mitchell II), the
Supreme Court held that language authorizing a federal agency to manage resources, coupled with actual federal control over these resources,
can trigger a full fiduciary trust responsibility, even where there is no
explicit statutory provision, nor a comprehensive statutory or regulatory
scheme establishing such a responsibility. 4 2 In Mitchell II, the Court
found a full fiduciary responsibility where the federal government had
"comprehensive control over the harvesting of Indian timber" and "exercise[d] literally daily supervision over [its] harvesting and management." 43 Therefore, where there is no explicit provision creating the
federal trust responsibility a tribe must show that the federal government
exercises comprehensive or pervasive control over a particular asset
before it can hold the federal government legally accountable for breach
of their full fiduciary responsibility." Moreover, even where there may
be a statutory scheme that involves federal government oversight, if the
statute is designed to give tribes independent control over the resource
management, it is quite difficult for tribes to show that such a statute
entitles the tribe to compensation for resource mismanagement. 45 The
scope of the federal trust responsibility contains more nuanced layers
than this basic framework provides; nevertheless, a skeletal foundation is
essential in order to explore how the federal trust responsibility intersects
with tribal water rights and tribal water rights settlements.
II.

THE FEDERAL TRUST RESPONSIBILITY AND TRIBAL WATER RIGHTS

Under the Winters doctrine, established by the Supreme Court in
Winters v. United States, water rights are reserved rights and an asset that
46
the federal government holds in trust for federally recognized tribes.
42 See Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 225; see also White Mountain Apache Tribe v. United
States, 11 Cl. Ct. 614, 650 (1987) (holding that where the federal government chose to administer a grazing land leasing program with the tribe, it undertook a full fiduciary responsibility
as to such lands).
43 United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465, 474 (2003) (quoting
Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 209, 222).
44 See id.
45 See Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Cmty. v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 201, 204

(1992) ("Due to the much higher level of control the Indians in this case exercise over their
lands, no fiduciary obligation or trust relationship attaches with respect to delivery of water to
those lands."); HANDBOOK, supra note 4, § 5.05[l][b], at 431. This exemplifies one of the
great ironies of the federal-tribal trust relationship as it relates to tribal self-government. As
one legal scholar explained, "[t]he more a Tribe is involved in management of the resource,
the less likely the government can be held responsible for its role, even though it retains
ultimate approval authority over all transactions involving an interest in trust land." Gover,
supra note 27, at 352.
46 Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 577 (1908); HANDBOOK, supra note 4,
§ 19.06, at 1221 ("The underlying premise of the Winters doctrine is the government's promise, implicit in the establishment of reservations, to make them livable and to enable the tribes
to become self-sustaining.").
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These reserved water rights are, in part, intertwined with the reserved

right to the land itself.47 But even where there is no explicitly reserved
trust land, water rights may still be reserved as trust assets if they are
necessary to facilitate tribal practices, such as fishing.4 8 Therefore, the
Supreme Court has held that treaties reserving fishing rights for a tribe
must also necessarily ensure access to the water, even if the federal government does not hold the land through which the water flows in trust for
the tribe. 49 Despite the understanding50 that tribal water rights are trust
assets "as much as the land itself,"5 1 it is often difficult for a tribe to hold
the federal government accountable for breaching its trust responsibility
as related to these water rights. 52 This legal challenge is largely due to
the fact that tribal "water rights do not fall neatly into the Court's categories for full enforceable fiduciary obligations."5 3 Legal scholar Nell Jessup Newton explains that because there are often no comprehensive
statutory or regulatory schemes imposing duties on the federal govern47 See Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576 (1908) ("The Indians had command
of the land and waters-command of all their beneficial use, whether kept for hunting . . . or
turned to agriculture and the arts of civilization. Did they give up all this? Did they reduce the
area of their occupation and give up the waters which made it valuable or adequate?").
48 See United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905) (holding that the 1859 treaty
between the United States and the Yakima Indians reserved the Yakima's right to fish on the
Columbia River, despite the need to cross over land that was not tribal trust land in order to
access the river).
49 See id.

50 See Royster, supra note 3, at 375 ("There can be no doubt that tribal water rights form
part of the trust corpus protected by the federal-tribal trust relationship."). While this is a wellestablished rule today, for many years following the Winters decision it was not clear just how
much water the tribes were entitled to. See John E. Thorson et al., Dividing Western Waters: A
Century of Adjudicating Rivers and Streams, Part II, 9 U. DENV. WATER L. REv. 299, 306

(2006) (explaining how the Winters reserved-water-rights doctrine lay "almost dormant" for
fifty years before the Supreme Court articulated the "practicably irrigable acreage" (PIA) standard to determine the quantity of tribal reserved water in Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546,
601 (1963)); see also Fort Mojave Indian Tribe v. United States, 32 Fed. Cl. 29, 34-35 (1994).
To make the PIA determination, experts "analyze the potential cost/benefit ratios of hypothetical irrigation projects . . . and the crops to be grown.

. .

. [I]f the return from the expected crops

exceeds the costs of a project, that land is deemed practicably irrigable . . . ." Id.
51 Royster, supra note 3, at 375. But see Grey v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 285, 293
(1990), aff'd, No. 91-5001, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 11705 (Fed. Cir. May 24, 1991) (noting
that water for irrigation is not a trust corpus because, unlike the timber in Mitchell II, the water
does not need to be "managed in such a way as to conserve the asset while maximizing income" from the asset to then distribute as profit to the tribe).
52 See Fort Mojave Indian Tribe, 32 Fed. Cl. at 33, 36 (recognizing the tribe's water

rights as a "trust property . . . which the government, as trustee, has a duty to preserve" but
finding no breach of this trust duty because the government had a "reasonable basis" for failing to secure water rights for 26,293 acres of tribal trust land); White Mountain Apache Tribe
of Arizona v. United States, 11 Cl. Ct. 614, 644 (1987) (finding no breach of governmental
trust duty even if the record had shown that the government "diverted [the tribe's] water for
the benefit of downstream users or otherwise suppressed exercise of [the tribe's] Winters Doctrine rights" because the tribe failed to show any "continuing wrong").
53 Royster, supra note 3, at 379.
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ment to manage tribal water, and because the federal government does
not control tribal water on a daily basis, tribal water rights fall only
within the "limited trust concept." 5 4 This limited trust concept often
leaves tribes with no express federal trust responsibility to protect their
water rights. Not only is there a general absence of statutes establishing
an explicit trust responsibility as to tribal water rights, but the United
States Court of Federal Claims has established that the federal government has no obligation to develop irrigation infrastructure for tribes,5 5 or
to ensure that tribal allotments have irrigation water.5 6 Given where tribal water rights often fall in the federal-tribal trust scheme, tribal water
settlements play an important role in the development of tribal water
rights.5 7

III.

THE FEDERAL TRUST RESPONSIBILITY AND TRIBAL WATER
RIGHTS SETTLEMENTS

Tribes often prefer to resolve water conflicts via settlement, as opposed to litigation, for many of the same reasons that settlement is often

preferable to litigation in other situations-it is generally less time-consuming 58 and less expensive. 59 Additionally, as the Commissioner of the
federal Bureau of Reclamation has stated more than once, water
"[s]ettlements improve water management by providing certainty not just
as to the quantification of a tribe's water rights but also as to the rights of

all water users." 60 Beyond the certainty benefits, these settlements also
give tribes an opportunity to establish water development and water man54 Nell Jessup Newton, Indian Claims in the Courts of the Conqueror,41 AM. U. L. REV.

753, 807 (1992).
55 See Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Cmty. v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 201, 204
(1992) ("Due to the much higher level of control the Indians . . . exercise over their lands, no
fiduciary obligation or trust relationship attaches with respect to the delivery of water to those
lands.").
56 See Grey v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 285, 293 (1990) (holding that "the General
Allotment Act does not impose any duty on the Government to manage the water on each
individual allotment").
57 See Royster, supra note 3, at 381 ("In some instances, provisions of water settlement
acts may create actual federal control or establish a special relationship sufficient to give rise
to enforceable fiduciary duties.").
58 But see Thorson et al., supra note 50, at 444 ("[N]egotiations often take a very long
time to accomplish, nearly as long as litigation.").
59 See COLBY ET AL., supra note 5, at 88-89 ("In the early 1980s, the Justice Department

estimated that an average of $3 million was spent in preparation to litigate each Indian water
rights case.... The costs of litigated settlements tend to be especially high, but the same type
of technical studies and preparation usually are required for negotiations. In both litigation
and negotiation, the parties typically retain attorneys, engineers, hydrologists, and other
experts.").
60 H.R. 3254 Statement, supra note 7, at 15; Crow Tribe Water Rights Settlement Act of
2009: Hearing on H.R. 3563 Before the Subcomm. on Water and Power of the H. Comm. on

Natural Resources, 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Michael L. Connor, Commissioner, Bureau of Reclamation).

212

CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 21:201

agement projects that will meet their specific water needs more accurately than would be possible by court order.6 1 For example, tribal water
settlement agreements often establish the opportunity to market water
off-reservation, facilitate agreements with neighboring private parties,
create protections for tribal fisheries and wetlands, enact conservation
measures for urban users, resolve co-existing non-water issues, deliver
cash for tribal development, and establish water banking provisions. 62 In
contrast, litigation over water rights results in the "determination of paper rights to water with no funding for water development projects or
delivery systems, and sometimes with limitations on water use." 6 3
Despite the benefits of negotiation, settlements are not the panacea
to tribal water rights conflicts, not leastly becausesettlement negotiations
can sometimes take as long as litigation. 64 Moreover, where Congress,
state legislatures, and tribal councils are responsible for funding and im-

plementing the terms of a settlement, it may be years before the benefits
of the agreement reach the involved parties. 65 Additionally, while settlements can provide tribes with more creative resolutions than what would
be available to them in court, many tribes ultimately agree to receive a
lesser amount of water than they would likely be able to get through
litigation. 66 Moreover, as water quantification is "the central feature of
every settlement act," 67 a tribe that enters into the settlement negotiations
without an established water quantity will often be in a weaker bargaining position than a tribe that understands how much water it is entitled to
61 Thorson et al., supra note 50, at 406-07 ("Rather than a narrow determination of
water rights, settlements can include beneficial water management provisions that are beyond
a court's capacity to order."); see also COLBY ET AL., supra note 5, at 45 (quoting Taos Pueblo

tribal council member Nelson Cordova commenting that "[tihe important advantage that we
felt negotiation has over litigation is the fact that the parties that are involved in the negotiations have the ability to craft an agreement whereby they can allocate the water that is available. Also, they have the ability to put that water to use, especially at the tribal level");
MCCOOL, supra note 10, at 55 (explaining that it is not always an either-or situation with
litigation and negotiation because "[o]ften the necessary precursor to negotiation is a litigation
strategy aimed at winning recognition of the power of one or more parties. Such recognition
may occur only after prolonged litigation").
62 Thorson et al., supra note 50, at 407.
63 HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at

§

19.05[2], at 1211; see also id. (stating that litigation

also presents "additional drawbacks" for tribes because it "takes place in a potentially hostile
forum, in which pre-adjudication administrative determinations are often made by state agencies, and judicial determinations are made by state judges ultimately answerable to the
voters").
64 Thorson et al., supra note 50, at 444.
65 See id. at 445 (noting that parties "alternate between negotiations and litigation as they
become disaffected with one or the other process" and as fully funded implementation "becomes more and more speculative"); supra note 13 and accompanying text.
66 HANDBOOK, supra note 4,

§

19.05[2], at 1219.

67 Id. § 19.05[2], at 1213; see id. n.330 ("In most cases, the quantity of water is set forth
in the settlement act itself.").
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at the start of the negotiation. 6 8 Some legal scholars find that the same
federal trust responsibility, which protects tribal water as a trust asset,
also extends to federal representation of tribes in settlement negotiations. 6 9 However, there is no statute requiring the federal government to
provide tribes with a negotiation team to represent them in settlement
negotiations. 70 The Western Water Policy Review Act of 1992 recognizes the federal government's "trust responsibilities to protect Indian
water rights and assist Tribes in the wise use of those resources"; 7' however, given the federal trust responsibility scheme, mere recognition of a
general trust responsibility may not guarantee full protection for tribes. 7 2
Settlement negotiations for tribal water rights are also subject to the
vulnerabilities of federal funding.7 3 While the federal government has
preferred to determine tribal water rights through settlement instead of
litigation, 74 there is still hesitancy to federally fund the negotiation process itself as well as the water development and management projects
arising from the settlement agreements.75 The federal government is not
68 Id.

§ 19.05[2], at 1219 (citing JOHN A. FOLK-WILLIAMS,
70, 100 (Western Network 1982)).

WHAT INDIAN WATER MEANS

TO THE NEW WEST

69 See Royster, supra note 3, at 378.

70 See id. One might think such a statute obligating the government to provide representation is unnecessary given the past and current governmental support for tribal water rights
settlement negotiations, but without a statute, this support does not hold much force because it
does not create a trust responsibility that will be compensable if breached. For an example of
government support for tribal water rights settlement negotiations, see H.R. 3254 Statement,
supra note 7, at 15.
71 Western Water Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-575, tit. XXX, § 3002(9), 106
Stat. 4600.
72 See HANDBOOK, supra note 4,

§

19.06, at 1221 ("For political and institutional rea-

sons, the United States has failed to secure, protect, and develop adequate water supplies for
many Indian tribes.").
73 See Thorson et al., supra note 50, at 445 ("Reduced federal budgets are a real threat to
the continued success of negotiated settlements."); WATER NEEDS AND STRATEGIES, supra note

9, at 18 (noting that the Department of the Interior "has been asserting that its contribution to
settlements should be no more than its calculable legal exposure and that even this can be
narrowly drawn so that often its financial obligation is little or none").
74 See H.R. 3254 Statement, supra note 7, at 15 ("[F]or over 20 years, federally recognized Indian tribes, states, local parties, and the Federal government have acknowledged that,
when possible, negotiated Indian water rights settlements are preferable to protracted litigation
over Indian water rights claims."); Working Group in Indian Water Settlements; Criteria and
Procedures for the Participation of the Federal Government in Negotiations for the Settlement
of Indian Water Rights Claims, 55 Fed. Reg. 9223 (Mar. 12, 1990) ("Indian water rights are
vested property rights for which the United States has a trust responsibility, with the United
States holding title to such water in trust for the benefit of the Indians. It is the policy of this
administration . . . that disputes regarding Indian water rights should be resolved through
negotiated settlements rather than litigation."); WATER NEEDS AND STRATEGIES, supra note 9,

at 18 ("It has long been the accepted premise that meeting the cost of Indian water and infrastructure in Indian water rights settlements is the trust responsibility of the federal
government.").
75 H.R. 3254 Statement, supra note 7, at 17 (noting that the Department of the Interior

had concerns regarding the "large Federal contribution" to the trust fund created by the pro-
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responsible for funding every aspect of the settlement agreement; 76 however, if the federal government were to cease funding negotiation teams
and withhold its share of the implementation costs for the water development and management projects, it would be akin to denying tribes the
rights to their water altogether.7 7
IV.

THE TAOS PUEBLO INDIAN WATER RIGHTS
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

Taos Pueblo, the northernmost of the nineteen New Mexico Pueblos, is located approximately seventy miles north of Santa Fe, New
Mexico.7 8 Taos Pueblo encompasses approximately 95,341 acres of land
and includes the headwaters of the Rio Pueblo de Taos and the Rio
Lucero. 79 Unlike most other federally recognized tribes, whose land the
federal government holds in trust, the Taos Pueblo once owned their land
in fee simple. 80 Despite this unique historical land title, in the 1913 decision of United States v. Sandoval, the Supreme Court found that the New
Mexico Pueblos, "although sedentary rather than nomadic in their inclinations, and disposed to peace and industry, [were] nevertheless Indians
in race, customs, and domestic government," 8' and therefore required
"federal guardianship and protection." 82 Sandoval vindicated the
Pueblo's established position that all prior land transfers were invalid as
violating the Nonintercourse Act of 1870.83
posed Taos Pueblo Indian Water Rights Settlement Act); Thorson et al., supra note 50, at 445,
n.964 (explaining that when former Deputy Secretary of the Interior David Hayes asked a
congressman to support a $3 million dollar negotiation budget increase, the congressman responded: "Why should we give you more money to negotiate when you'll only bring us expensive settlements to fund?").
76 HANDBOOK, supra note 4, § 19.05[2], at 1214 ("For the most part, costs are shared
among various parties, including the federal government, the tribes, the states, and local water
users.").
77 WATER NEEDS AND STRATEGIms, supra note 9, at 19 ("To deny the tribes the funds
necessary to ensure competent legal and hydrologic expertise is tantamount to denying them

the right to defend a basic component of their physical and cultural survival.").
78 H.R. 3254 Statement, supra note 7, at 15.
79 Id.
80 Id. ("In 1858, Congress specifically confirmed many Pueblo land titles, including that

of Taos Pueblo.... Subsequently, patents were issued to the Pueblos of New Mexico, which
... quitclaimed any interest the United States had in the Pueblos' land."); see also COLBY ET
AL., supra note 5, at 13 ("Settling Pueblo water rights is complex because determining the
quantity of their rights requires a historical inquiry based on treaty rights and interpretation by
three different sovereigns. Over the past six hundred years, the Pueblos were 'ruled' by Spain,
Mexico, and then the United States. As each sovereign ceded power to the next, the new
government redefined tribal rights.").
81 United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 39 (1913).
82 Id. at 48; H.R. 3254 Statement, supra note 7, at 15.

83 See County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 231-32 (1985)
("[The Nonintercourse Act of 1870] prohibited the conveyance of Indian land except where
such conveyances were entered pursuant to the treaty power of the United States.").
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The Sandoval decision created confusion regarding the Pueblo land
title, which Congress sought to clarify with the Pueblo Lands Act of
1924.84 The Pueblo Lands Act attempted to "settle the complicated
questions of title and to secure for the Indians all of the lands which they
are equitably entitled."8 5 However, because the Act allowed non-Indians
to receive title to Pueblo land, as long as they showed they had used and
occupied Pueblo land for a certain period of time, the Taos Pueblo lost
2,401.16 acres to non-Indian claims under the Act.8 6 Furthermore, the
compensation for this lost land was less than the "actual appraised values."87 Due to this massive land loss, Congress enacted the Pueblo
Lands Act of 1933 to provide additional compensation for the Pueblo
and expressly reserve prior Pueblo water rights.88 While the 1924 and
1933 Acts attempted to restore the Pueblo's loss of "economic base" and
land title certainty, the title to the Pueblo's water rights was still
unsettled. 89
This water title uncertainty "has continued to plague the Taos Valley" and prompted a 1969 general stream adjudication of the Rio Pueblo
de Taos and Rio Hondo stream systems and interrelated groundwater.9 o
In 1989, the United States filed a statement of claims on behalf of the
Taos Pueblo, which was later revised in 1997.91 The revised claim was
for nearly "the entire flow and interrelated groundwater of the Rio
Pueblo de Taos and the Rio Lucero." 9 2 According to the Commissioner
of the Bureau of Reclamation, if the United States were to win on this
claim for the Taos Pueblo, the "impact on non-Indian water users in the
Taos Valley w[ould] be nothing short of devastating," 93 because the nonIndian water users in the area could only use the water if the Taos Pueblo
forewent exercising its own water title rights. 94 Due to the slow process
of the general stream adjudication, 95 and the recognition that uncertainty
over water rights could continue for decades, the negotiation process began and involved multiple parties: the Taos Pueblo, the United States,
the State of New Mexico, the Taos Valley Acequia Association (repre84 H.R. 3254 Statement, supra note 7, at 15.

85 Id. (quoting Pueblo Lands Act of 1924, 43 Stat. 636).
86 Id.

Id
88 Id. at 15-16.
89 Id. at 16.
87

90 Id.
91 Id.
93

Id.
Id.

94

Id.

92

95 See id. (noting that partial summary judgment motions were filed in 1991 and were
fully briefed in 1995; however, the Court has taken no further action).
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senting fifty-five community ditch associations), 96 the Town of Taos, the
El Prado Water and Sanitation District (EPWSD), 97 and twelve Mutual
Domestic Water Consumers Associations. 98 All parties finally signed a
settlement agreement in the spring of 2006.99
V.

THE TAOS PUEBLO INDIAN WATER RIGHTS SETTLEMENT ACT

The Taos Pueblo Indian Water Rights Settlement Act ratifies the
Settlement Agreement of 2006 (Settlement Agreement) between the
United States, the Taos Pueblo, the State of New Mexico, the Taos Valley Acequia Association and its fifty-five member ditches, the town of
Taos, the EPWSD, and the twelve Taos-area Mutual Domestic Water
Consumers Associations.10 0 The Settlement Act
directs the Secretary of the Interior, acting through the
Commissioner of Reclamation, to provide: (1) grants and
technical assistance to the Pueblo to construct, replace,
or rehabilitate water infrastructure, to protect the environment associated with the Buffalo Pasture area, and to
enhance watershed conditions; and (2) financial assistance to eligible non-Pueblo entities for mutual-benefit
projects in accordance with the Agreement. Establishes
in the Treasury the Taos Pueblo Water Development
Fund. Authorizes the Pueblo to market its water rights
under the Agreement. Directs the Secretary to enter into
three repayment contracts for the delivery of specified
amounts of San Juan-Chama Project water to the Pueblo,
the town of Taos, and EPWSD. Provides for the waiver
and release of claims against the parties to New Mexico
96 See Press Release, Office of the State Engineer, Local Negotiating Parties Release
Draft Taos Pueblo Water Rights Settlement Agreement (Mar. 31, 2006), available at http://
www.docstoc.com/docs/68245071/Local-Negotiating-Parties-Release-Draft-Taos-PuebloWater-Rights (commenting that the Taos Valley Acequia Association represents several thousand Taos Valley irrigators and has been involved in the Abeyta negotiations since they started
in October 1989).
97 See id. ("El Prado Water and Sanitation District is a political subdivision of the state
that provides services to close to 1200 people in around the community of El Prado, north of
the Town of Taos.").
98 See id. ("The 12 Taos-area Mutual Domestic Water Consumers Associations are community water systems and political subdivisions of the state that provide domestic water to
thousands of people in the rural non-Indian communities in the Taos Valley.").
99 See id.

11h3254/show# [hereinafter H.R. 3254 Official Summary] (follow "Official Summary: Read the
Rest") (last visited Apr. 1, 2011). The Taos Pueblo Indian Water Rights Settlement Act was
included in the Claims Resettlement Act of 2010, which President Obama signed into law on
December 8, 2010. See Claims Resettlement Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-291, 124 Stat. 3064
(20 10), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=hl 11-4783.
100 See H.R. 3254 Official Summary, OPEN CONGRESS, www.opencongress.org/bill/l
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v. Abeyta and New Mexico v. Arellano in return for recognition of the Pueblo's water rights. Authorizes appropriations for FY2010-FY2016 for the Taos Pueblo
Infrastructure and Watershed Fund, for the Taos Pueblo
Water Development Fund, and for Mutual-Benefit
Projects funding (to minimize adverse impacts on the
Pueblo's water resources by moving future non-Indian
ground water pumping away from the Pueblo's Buffalo
Pasture and to implement the resolution of a dispute over
the allocation of certain surface water flows between the
Pueblo and non-Indian irrigation water right owners in
the community of Arroyo Seco Arriba). 0 1
The Settlement Act also creates a waiver of potential breach of trust
and water-related claims that the Taos Pueblo may bring against the
United States, including:
all claims for damages, losses or injuries to water rights
or claims of interference with, diversion or taking of
water (including but not limited to claims for injury to
lands resulting from such damages, losses, injuries, interference with, diversion, or taking) in the Rio Grande
mainstream or its tributaries or for lands within the Taos
Valley that accrued at any time up to and including the
Enforcement Date; and . .. all claims against the State of

New Mexico, its agencies, or employees relating to the
negotiation or the adoption of the Settlement
Agreement. 102
This waiver, a standard provision in almost every tribal water rights settlement agreement, 0 3 helps define the boundaries of the tribe's water
rights, and as a consequence, provides "states and non-Indian water users
with certainty" concerning such boundaries.104
While settlement agreements define the boundaries of the tribal
water rights in relation to other non-Indian parties' rights, such recognition does not ensure that the tribe will automatically receive the water
101 H.R. 3254 Official Summary, supra note 100.
102 See Claims Resettlement Act of 2010 § 510(3); see also H.R. 3254 Statement, supra

note 7, at 16 (stating that there were a number of potential claims against the United States
related to its failure to effectively administer the Taos Pueblo water rights, and that while
recovering damages against the United States was not a guarantee, these cases still have both
fiscal and policy-related consequences).
103 See COLBY ET AL., supra note 5, at 89-91 ("Almost every Indian water settlement
requires the tribe to waive . . . damage claims against . .. the United States[ ] for failing as

trustee to protect the tribe's water rights.").
104

Id. at 91.
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that the settlement guarantees.10 5 Settlements often establish funds and
projects-such as the Taos Pueblo Infrastructure and Watershed Fund,
the Taos Pueblo Water Development Fund, and the Taos Pueblo Buffalo
Pasture watershed project-all of which require time and money to successfully implement. 106 While the federal government is not the only
entity responsible for funding tribal water rights settlements,10 7 it is often
the largest contributor,10 8 and as such, federal funding of settlements is
imperative to successful and sustainable implementation of the settlement provisions and projects.
Unfortunately, the federal government funds Indian water settlements on a discretionary basis. A settlement will only receive funds
when there is a reduction in another area of the Interior Department's
budget.109 Finding that there was insufficient federal funds from the Interior Department, New Mexico Senator Pete Domenici sought to raise
money through "the Reclamation Water Settlements Fund Act of 2007,
which would authorize a ten-year funding source to generate an estimated 1.37 billion to pay for three [New Mexico Indian Water Rights]
settlements," including that of the Taos Pueblo.o1 0 Senator Domenici intended the fund to help pay for "planning, designing, or construction acThe Reclamation Water
tivities of the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation."'
Settlements Fund Act (Fund), effective March 30, 2009, allows the Secretary of the Treasury to use money from the Fund on an annual basis as
is
necessary to pay the Federal share of the remaining costs
of implementing the Indian water rights settlement
agreements entered into by the State of New Mexico in
the Aamodt adjudication and the Abeyta adjudication, if
such settlements are subsequently approved and author105 Id. at 71.

106 See generally id. at 69-75 (discussing the funding of Indian water settlement
agreements).
107 See HANDBOOK, supra note 4, § 19.05[2], at 1214.
108 See COLBY ET AL., supra note 5, at 85 ("Most settlements have included money or inkind contributions from the state government, local water users, and even the tribe, in addition
to the usually much larger federal share.").
109 See COLBY ET AL., supra note 5, at 70; Submission from Western States Water Council, Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee Water Conference, Water Conference
Question 3, at 3-4 (Apr. 5, 2005) availableat http://energy.senate.gov/public/_files/Question3
SelectedParticipantSubmittals.pdf.
110 Kay Matthews, Updates on Water Transfer Protests and Adjudications, LA JICARITA
NEWS, Aug. 2007, http://www.lajicarita.org/07aug.htm (last visited Apr. 7, 2011).
111 Id.; see also Domenici Seeks Money for Water Rights Cases, ABQ JouRNAL, June 19,
2007, http://www.journalnorth.com/571907northnewsO6-19-07.htm (last visited Apr. 7,
2010) (explaining that the Fund would be supported by various sources, including leases and
rents of federally-owned land in Western states, with federal oil and gas royalty payments
contributing to about 40 percent annually to the Fund).

IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WE TRUST?

2011]

219

ized by an Act of Congress and the implementation period has not already expired. 112
The maximum amount used for such settlements cannot exceed $250
million, and the ability to draw such funds is not effective until January
1, 2020.113 The Fund will terminate on September 30, 2034, at which
point the termination clause provides that any "unexpended and unobligated balance of the Fund shall be transferred to the appropriate fund of
the Treasury.""14 Should there not be adequate federal funds elsewhere,
this Fund provides additional money for the Taos Pueblo Indian Water
Rights Settlement Act.'1 5 The Fund also provides money for the settlement agreement between Arizona and the Navajo Nation concerning
water rights claims in the Lower Colorado River basin,'l 6 and certain
other water rights settlements between Montana and the Blackfeet, Crow,
Gros Ventre, and Assiniboine Tribes of the Fort Belknap Indian Reservation." 7 While the Fund helps to ensure that the federal government will
be able to pay its share of the Taos Pueblo Indian Water Rights Settlement Act's implementation costs, the fact that such an additional fund is
needed indicates the decade-long federal government's hesitancy to pay
its share of the settlement implementation costs without taking from
other much-needed Indian programs.11 8
Without allocating funds that stand independent from the general
annual budgets of the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Bureau of Reclamation under the Department of the Interior, the federal funds for Indian
water rights settlements must come from these general annual budgets,
and as a result, necessarily take monies away from other Indian programs.' 19 A separate fund, such as the Reclamation Water Settlements
Fund, might help ensure that "the Federal Government's share of the cost
of settlement of its own legal and trust liabilities to individual tribes is
112 Reclamation Water Settlements Fund Act, 43 U.S.C. § 407(c)(3)(B)(ii)(I) (2009).
113 Id. § 407(c)(3)(B)(ii)(II).
114 Id. § 407(f).

115

See id. § 407(c)(3)(B)(ii)(I).
116 Id. § 407(c)(3)(B)(iv)(I).
117 Id. § 407(c)(3)(B)(iii)(I).
118 See COLBY ET AL., supra note 5, at 72 ("[Alppropriations made to fulfill the federal

government's responsibilities in water rights settlements or land claims are lumped together
under the Function 302 cap with spending for all other Indian and Department of Interior
programs .

. .

. Thus, comparatively large appropriations for Indian water settlements or land

claims effectively displace funding for other Indian and Interior programs under the Function
302 budget cap rule, and may appear to be imbalanced increases in programmatic funding for
individual tribal programs.").
119 See MCCOOL, supra note 10, at 62 (explaining that in the end, Senator Babbit's attempt in the early 1990s to create a separate line item for Indian water settlements in the
Bureau of Indian Affairs budget did not effectively mitigate the problem because "[flrom a
practical perspective, it is a zero-sum thing. Congress wants to spend only so much. There is
x billion dollars available for Indian programs, so the settlements have to come out of that").
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not paid at the expense of programs serving all tribes."1 20 Unfortunately,
passing a bill to ensure there is adequate and sufficiently independent
funding for each and every Indian water rights settlement is neither an
efficient, nor practical long-term solution to the lack of federal funding
for Indian water rights settlements.121
VI. A LONG-TERM APPROACH TO THE FEDERAL TRUST
RESPONSIBILITY AND TRIBAL WATER RIGHTS SETTLEMENTS
As this Note articulates, due to the unique legal relationship between federally recognized Indian tribes and the federal government, federally recognized tribes depend on the United States to assure they have
adequate water, and the United States is consequently responsible for
fulfilling its trust responsibility as to this natural resource.1 2 2 It is a matter of policy choice how the United States government fulfills this responsibility. Inherent in the policy choices that inform the federal
government's decision to provide tribes with federal negotiation teams
for Indian water settlements is the tension in every federal trust responsibility-related decision-wanting to ensure an appropriate exercise of federal support without undermining tribal determination over tribal water
rights. In order to meet this tension effectively, the federal government
must take a more comprehensive approach to Indian water rights settlements than that reflected in the current tribal water rights settlement
funding scheme.
There is no doubt that negotiation can be a costly process. Often
litigation precedes negotiation, 12 3 as it did for the Taos Pueblo Indian
Water Rights Settlement Agreement, 1 2 4 but even where it does not, "the
cost of preparing for negotiation is virtually the same as preparing for a
court case ... [because] all the studies and preparatory work still have to
be completed." 1 2 5 Moreover, each party to the negotiation "must hire
attorneys and sometimes engineers and economists, and occasionally
facilitators, often at great expense." 26 Due to these expenses, it makes
120 COLBY ET AL, supra note 5, at 72.

121 See id. at 69 ("[T]he ad hoc nature of the settlement funding process ...

makes it

nearly impossible to predict the cumulative costs to the federal government to satisfy Indian
water entitlements.").
122 See HANDBOOK, supra note 4, § 19.06, at 1221.
123 See MCCOOL, supra note 10, at 56 ("[Flrequently the non-Indian competing water

users are not interested in reasonable negotiations and the threat of litigation is needed in order
to get them to the bargaining table."); see also id. at 55 ("Although some proponents of negotiation extol it as an alternative to the courts, nothing settles a dispute better than the combined
force of the strong arm of the court . . . and active negotiation.").
124 H.R. 3254 Statement, supra note 7, at 16.
125 MCCOOL, supra note 10, at 56 ("In litigation the money goes to lawyers; in negotia-

tion it goes to engineers and economists").
126 Id.

2011]

IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WE TRUST?

221

little sense to require tribes, who often face compromised financial situations, to fund the negotiation teams and provide the necessary experts to
participate in a water rights settlement. At the same time, in order to
ensure tribal interests are advanced effectively during water rights settlements, it is imperative that the tribes have as much control over their side
of the negotiation process as possible. Therefore, in order to give tribes
more direct control over the negotiation process, the federal government
could support tribal members in playing a more integral role in the negotiation teams; under the current approach, the tribes often simply depend
on the federal government to fulfill this role. 127 The federal government
would fulfill its trust responsibility to secure adequate water for tribes by
redirecting some of the resources it currently expends on federal negotiation teams toward training tribal members who could then take more active roles in the legal, economic, engineering, and water allocation
research that nearly every water rights settlement negotiation requires.
This training in turn would alleviate some of the burden on the federal
government to fund the entire tribal water rights negotiation teams because, over time, tribal members would be able to provide some of the
preparation-based expertise that the federal government would otherwise

have to provide. 12 8
By training tribal members to play a more integral role in the tribal
water rights negotiation teams, the federal government would not relinquish its trust responsibility to litigate on behalf of the tribes if litigation
became necessary, 129 nor would this shift dissolve its trust responsibility
to fund the implementation of the settlement agreements. Moreover, recognizing the federal capacity to train tribal members to be part of the
federal negotiation teams does not imply that there do not already exist
well-trained, skilled, and sophisticated tribal negotiation teams that have
been indispensable in Indian water rights settlements.1 3 0 It would be naMCCOOL, supra note 10, at 56.
128 As the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Reclamation Regional Plains Program
demonstrates, there are some current efforts to train tribal members in water-based skills such
as water quality sampling and water supply evaluations. See Native American Programs,
United States Bureau of Reclamation, http://www.usbr.gov/gp/native-american.cfm (last visited Apr. 6, 2011). This is precisely the kind of program that demonstrates the forward-looking approach whose fuller implementation in the tribal water rights settlement negotiation
scheme would be most fruitful.
129 See HANDBOOK, supra note 4, § 19.06, at 1223 ("The Justice Department is charged
with representing both tribal and federal interests in water rights litigations; as trustee, the
government is authorized not only to bring water rights claims on behalf of tribes, but to bind
them in litigation.").
130 See, e.g., Statement from Taos Pueblo Governor Paul T. Martinez, War Chief Luis
Romero and the Taos Pueblo Tribal Council on the Taos Pueblo/Abeyta Indian Water Rights
Settlement, (July 31, 2008), available at http://www.taospueblo.com/pdflWaterRightsSettle
metStatement.pdf (expressing gratitude to the Pueblo negotiation team which included tribal
attorneys, water task force members, and technical assistants).
127 See
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ive to presume that all federally recognized tribes lack the resources to
use their own negotiation teams to navigate the water rights settlement

process. It would deny the federal-tribal trust relationship, however, to
conclude that because some tribes can and do provide their own negotiation teams, the federal government no longer has the responsibility to
ensure that tribes have the negotiating power necessary to secure their
interests in tribal water rights settlements.13 1 This Note does not suggest
that the federal government terminate the trust relationship in relation to
Indian water rights settlement negotiations. Rather, it advances a reconceptualization of the manner in which the federal government fulfills this
trust responsibility, with an eye toward giving more decision-making
power to tribes by reallocating federal resources from strictly funding the
federal negotiation teams to instead training and encouraging tribal members to play more active roles in these water rights negotiation teams.
VHI.

CHALLENGES: FEDERAL HESITANCY TO FUND AND
COMPREHENSIVE PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION

In using federal resources to train tribal members to play more integral roles in the negotiation teams, the federal government must not
abandon its trust responsibility as to tribal water rights.132 One of the
ways to ensure that this would not happen is to recognize that the federal
government would still be responsible for funding its portion of the implementation cost of the settlement. However, because the federal government would likely hesitate to fund agreements where it does not have
extensive control over the settlement process, this might be an obstacle to
the practical implementation of this Note's proposed policy shift. 133
While this is a real concern, some Indian policy analysts believe that it is
the responsibility of the federal government to pay for the implementation costs of Indian water rights settlements irrespective of federal control over the negotiations because it is a moral duty born from
131 See COL3Y Er AL., supra note 5, at 51 ("Many tribes have become very sophisticated

about water rights issues and are undertaking very effective advocacy on their nations' behalf.
Others, however, have not prioritized water rights issues, or they are suffering from limited
institutional capability. Budget cuts in BIA programmatic funds to support the pursuit of tribal
water rights have had a significant, negative effect on many tribes' ability to push forward with
water rights claims." (quoting David Hayes, former chair of the Interior Department's Working Group on Indian Water Rights Settlements)).
132 This would be particularly important during any policy shift in the tribal water rights
arena. See id. at 44 ("[In] manag[ing] tribal water resources ... [i]f you depend on federal
resources, the resources sometimes are just not there. Also, we all know that the federal govemnment, even though it has a trust responsibility to the tribe-sometimes that trust responsibility is just not there." (quoting Taos Pueblo tribal council member Nelson Cordova)).
133 But see id. at 87 (explaining that many consider federal funding of Indian water settlements to "fulfill the promise of permanent tribal homelands by honoring and protecting the
reserved water rights of Indian tribes").
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unfavorable, past Indian policies. 1 34 Even if the tribes played a more
integral role in the tribal water rights negotiation teams, the federal government could ameliorate its funding hesitancy by maintaining a close
relationship with the federally-trained tribal negotiation teams prior to
and during the negotiation process. In reality, this would allow the federal government to continue to have the final word in the negotiationsas between the tribe and the federal government-because it would be
the entity providing the negotiation and implementation funds. Nevertheless, engaging tribes more earnestly in the tribal water rights negotiation process would mean that the tribes would have more of an
opportunity to determine the outcome of the negotiation process, and in
so doing, develop the expertise that would enable them to exercise more
self-determination in relation to the long-term future of their water resources. The particularities of the relationship between the federal government and the federally-trained tribal negotiation teams is beyond the
scope of this Note; however, whatever the particularities, it is clear that
in order for the proposed shift to succeed, there must be a willingness on
both sides 1 3 5-tribal and federal-to maintain open communication as to
water expectations, available funding, legal exposure, and all other elements that affect negotiation strategy and outcome.
In addition to requiring open communication prior to and during the
negotiation process, both the tribes and the federal government must be
willing to thoroughly transition to tribal members playing a more integral
role in the federal water rights negotiation teams. Although Congress
has the power to unilaterally shift Indian policy, 3 6 it would make little
134 See MCCOOL, supra note 10, at 64 ("There are many reasons why politicians support
settlements. For some, it is an effort to honor trust responsibilities . . . ."); Robert T. Anderson,
Indian Water Rights and the FederalTrust Responsibility, 46 NAT. RESOURCEs J. 399, 430-31
(2006) ("Since establishment of the Bureau of Reclamation in 1902, the federal government
has enshrined the diversion of Indian water for non-Indian use as federal policy, and simply
left the Indian tribes out of the development mix. In addition to its failure to develop water for
Indian agricultural uses, the federal government did virtually nothing to ensure that water
remained instream to satisfy the needs of fish and wildlife preserved in treaties and
agreements.").
135 See COLBY ET AL., supra note 5, at 45 ("[W]e need human resources, we need financial resources, we need a commitment from the tribe not only in terms of providing the two
resources I named but also having a commitment to protect its water resources in the future.
Without the technical capacity within the tribe to manage our water, this is not going to happen." (quoting Taos Pueblo tribal council member Nelson Cordova)).
136 See, e.g., supra note 29; see also Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565-66
(1903) ("Plenary authority over the tribal relations of the Indians has been exercised by Congress from the beginning, and the power has always been deemed a political one, not subject to
be controlled by the judicial department of the government . . .. The power exists to abrogate
the provisions of an Indian treaty, though presumably such power will be exercised only when
circumstances arise which will not only justify the government in disregarding the stipulations
of the treaty, but may demand, in the interest of the country and the Indians themselves, that is
should do so.").
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sense to force a tribe to use its own members to negotiate if the tribe
judged that the federal negotiation team would be more effective in the
negotiation process. It would make the most sense to engage federallytrained tribal negotiation teams on a discretionary basis, where the tribes
wish to take advantage of the federal training, but not otherwise. Even
where both sides are completely desirous of this significant policy shift,
it would likely take decades to implement it because the appropriate federal and tribal parties would need to thoroughly integrate the shift into all
aspects of the Indian water rights settlement funding process. Despite
the significant time and effort this shift would require,it is precisely this
long-term commitment to tribal involvement that this Note suggests is a
desirable approach for the federal government to take toward tribal water
rights negotiations.
CONCLUSION

As the global population grows, water will only be an increasingly
prized resource. Tribes living in the Western region of the United States
will continue to feel the political and environmental pressure that arises
whenever multiple populations need a single resource.' 37 The legal trust
relationship between the federal government and federally recognized Indian tribes requires that the federal government fulfill its trust responsibility by providing and protecting water resources for tribes.138
Although the federal governmental policy favors resolving Indian water
rights disputes through settlement over litigation, the federal trust responsibility has not dissolved. 139 In the past, the federal government has attempted to fulfill this trust responsibility by using funds from the Bureau
of Indian Affairs and the Bureau of Reclamation budgets, at the expense
of other much-needed Indian programs.140 Unfortunately, this settlement-funding scheme does not adequately fulfill the federal duty to provide and protect the water to which negotiating tribes are entitled.14 1 In
order to more effectively fulfill its trust responsibility, while simultaneously relieving some of the federal funding burden, the federal govern137 The scarcity of water in the West is complicated by the differing systems under which
different communities claim their water. See, e.g., COLBY ET AL., supra note 5, at 95 ("On the

one hand, tribes have a federal reserved right to an amount of water sufficient to achieve the
purpose of their reservation of land. This right can lie dormant until the tribe is ready to use its
water .... On the other hand, since the late nineteenth century, non-Indian irrigators in the
West generally have developed water under a system of prior appropriation . . . [which] has
given non-Indian irrigators every incentive to develop an area's water resources as rapidly as
possible, despite any unquantified tribal claims to that water.").
138 See HANDBOOK supra note 4,

§

19.06, at 1221 ("Congress has recognized the federal

government's 'trust responsibilities to protect Indian water rights ....
139 See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
140 See supra note 118.
141 See supra note 72.
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ment should approach Indian water rights settlements with a policy that
takes a longer-term view than the current settlement-by-settlement funding scheme. The Taos Pueblo Indian Water Rights Settlement, a fortyyear dispute1 4 2 that has only recently produced a congressionally approved Settlement Act, 143 which will require years to fully implement, 144
is a perfect example of the multi-stakeholder water disputes that occupy
the legal landscape of tribal water rights in the Western United States
today. As the Taos Pueblo Indian Water Rights Settlement and the subsequent Reclamation Water Settlements Fund of 2009 demonstrate, the
federal government still struggles to fund Indian water rights settlements
in a manner that adequately upholds the federal trust responsibility without overburdening the federal funding scheme. 14 5
This Note provided the basic framework of the federal-tribal trust
relationship before explaining how the federal trust responsibility applies
to tribal water rights and tribal water rights settlements. Focusing on the
Taos Pueblo Indian Water Rights Settlement because it demonstrates the
still-current federal hesitancy to fund tribal water settlements, this Note
suggested that one way the federal government could more effectively
fulfill its trust responsibility regarding tribal water rights settlements
would be to train and encourage tribal members to play more integral
roles in the federal negotiation teams that the tribes often depend on the
federal government to provide. 146 Over time, this approach would both
alleviate some of the burden on the federal government to fund federal
negotiation for tribal water rights claims, and more importantly, would
encourage the tribal self-government that will be necessary to ensure
long-term tribal water security. This Note concludes that despite potential implementation challenges, an approach that takes a longer-term
view toward tribal water rights settlements than that which the federal
government currently uses is necessary to ensure that tribes receive all
the water to which they are entitled. 147
142

See

COLBY ET AL.,

supra note 5, at 45 ("[T]he [original] Abeyta case was filed in

1969.").
143
144

See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
See COLBY ET AL., supra note 5, at 77 ("Carrying out all the provisions of Indian water

settlements can take decades, and most settlements passed by Congress have not yet been fully
implemented.").
145 See MCCOOL, supra note 10, at 63 ("The continuing effort to pass such legislation [to
set aside separate funds for Indian water settlements] makes it evident that this serious problem
persists.").
146 See also COLBY ET AL., supra note 5, at 44 ("[Iun order to manage tribal water resources, you need individuals that are trained in some of the areas I alluded to earlier[, such as
history, mathematics, economics.]" (quoting Nelson Cordova, former Taos Pueblo tribal administrator, three-term tribal secretary, one-term Taos Pueblo governor, and lifetime tribal
council member)).
147 This is necessary not only for tribal water security, but for non-Indian water security
as well. See WATER NEEDS AND STRATEGIEs, supra note 9, at 19 ("[Wjhile the number of
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pending [tribal water rights] settlements is set, the cost of implementing them will continue to
rise-meaning that postponing this duty only increases its cost to the nation, as it perpetuates
the hardship to Indian people unable to enjoy the full use of their water rights and the inability
of non-Indian governments to plan for water use in the absence of firm data on respective use
entitlements.").

